On 30 July the Trump administration issued a memorandum to secure the supply of recoverable Critical Minerals and Materials (CMMs) by controlling exports under Section 101 of the Defense Production Act. Included within these controls are black mass and used batteries. Following this the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a temporary rule to restrict exports of black mass and tungsten scrap without a license on 4 August, which it is now seeking feedback on. According to the summary “U.S. persons engaged in the sale of black mass and tungsten waste and scrap must allocate 100 percent of monthly sales to U.S. persons, unless an adjustment or exception is obtained in advance from BIS.” After publication on 6 August, there are 21 days permitted for feedback before official implementation on 27 August with an expiration date of 17 September 2027. “A ban on the export of black mass should redirect feedstock towards US recyclers,” said Frederick Bloomfield, a senior black mass pricing analyst at Benchmark. “The key question is whether the policy will accelerate the buildout of US black mass refining capacity and mitigate critical mineral leakage, or whether these rules can be circumvented.”

In July, Hunan Yuneng announced a price increase across its LFP CAM range, citing "global geopolitical fluctuations and supply chain disruptions" affecting sulphur, phosphoric acid, and iron sulphate. Hunan Yuneng will raise prices for all lithium iron phosphate products by a flat rate of RMB2,000/t (USD296/t) from 1 August, citing higher upstream raw material costs and strong demand exceeding available capacity. This could represent a boon for the LFP recycling market. Traditionally, this market has prioritised lithium carbonate among the recoverable materials due to its higher value, while recovery of iron phosphate has received less attention. However, the current price surge highlights the importance of all recoverable materials contained within LFP scrap.

Superalloys have become an increasingly important part of the cobalt supply chain. Superalloys are the largest source of cobalt demand behind battery applications. They are used in both commercial and defence aerospace applications. In 2025, cobalt demand from superalloys reached 20kt, up 7.5%, supported by increased defence spending, as assessed by Benchmark’s Cobalt Service. While cobalt-containing superalloys service a wide range of end markets, aerospace is the largest, accounting for 58% of cobalt demand from superalloys, approximately 11.5kt in 2025.

New data from Benchmark sheds light on the battery demand from defence applications. While still a fraction of the volume of the global battery industry, ongoing instability across multiple regions has highlighted the impact that battery-dependant applications can have on modern warfare.

The US has replaced its temporary 10% global tariff with a new Section 301 duty tied to a forced-labour investigation, covering 60 trading partners including Canada, Mexico, India and the UK. The measure took effect at 12:01am ET on 24 July 2026, as the prior Section 122 tariff – put in place after the Supreme Court ruled the administration could not impose duties by declaring a national emergency – expired. The new rate is 10% for 14 economies with existing forced-labour import bans or relevant trade commitments, and 12.5% for the remaining 46, including China. Brazil faces a separate 25% Section301 tariff from 22 July under a distinct case.

On 17 July, China’s finance ministry announced legislation ending eleven years of tax exemptions for the lithium ion battery industry. This is an effort to curtail overcapacity in the industry that is also likely to offer its growing sodium ion battery industry a comparative boost, as it will retain these exemptions. From 1 September 2026, a 2% consumption tax will be levied on lithium ion batteries, as well as all-vanadium redox flow and nickel-metal hydride batteries. From 1 September 2027, the rate will rise again to 4%.

Geely electric vehicles (EVs) will begin production at Ford’s facility in Valencia, Spain, in 2028. The two automotive brands have formed a Europe-focused joint venture that seeks to revitalise Valencia amid growing cost pressures and competition. The new partnership will manufacture two electric Geely SUVs as well as a new multi-powertrain Ford crossover. While Chinese automakers are increasingly looking towards overseas EV markets for growth against a backdrop of a subdued domestic EV market, the expansion of Geely’s Chinese EV brands into Europe has been much less pronounced than BYD and Chery.

Renewed tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have revived concerns over disruption to Middle Eastern crude exports, reintroducing cost pressure across the synthetic graphite anode value chain. Oil is a key feedstock in the production of petroleum coke which in turn is used to make synthetic graphite anodes. Since the start of the conflict in Iran, both Brent crude and Chinese slurry prices have risen, with the latest escalation elevating Brent prices further. As a result of the conflict and the rising cost of feedstock materials, prices for pre-calcined petroleum needle coke have risen 23% so far this year on an RMB-basis (26% on a USD-basis) according to Benchmark’s Synthetic Graphite Price Assessment.

Rare earth pricing trended downwards through most of April and May, before showing tentative signs of stabilisation and a slight recovery in June. Throughout the quarter, Benchmark’s China PrNd oxide index fell by ~5%, pulling back from the peak levels during the robust Q1 rally. However, heavy rare earths showed more divergent trends, with dysprosium and terbium staging a meaningful recovery by the end of the period. The defining theme of Q2, however, was the widening gulf between Chinese domestic and ex-China heavy rare earth prices, a continuation of dynamics set in motion by China's curbing of exports to Japan back in January. As the largest consumer of heavy rare earths outside China, Japan had historically relied heavily on direct Chinese supply. With that channel restricted since the start of the year, Japanese buyers spent Q2 aggressively sourcing material from the limited pool available in Europe and North America, progressively bidding up ex-China prices while Chinese domestic pricing remained comparatively insulated. 

VW Group plans to halve its model lineup as part of an upcoming restructure where it aims to cut costs by 20% and to keep the group competitive in a shifting automotive industry. Although an initial proposal to close production facilities as part of the restructure was rejected by the board, it has been reported that four facilities in Germany remain under consideration for closure due to high costs. The four sites, all of which produce electric vehicles (EVs), include an Audi site in Neckarsulm, as well as Volkswagen plants in Zwickau, Emden and Hanover.

Tensions between lithium miners in Zimbabwe and the country’s government, which plans to introduce a ban on concentrate exports in January 2027, dominated conversations at the recent Zimbabwe Chamber of Mine’s Annual Mining Conference (17–20 June). The Benchmark Lithium Service was represented on the conference stage by lithium analyst Luc Braun who delivered a presentation on Zimbabwe’s domestic hard-rock conversion and downstreaming ambitions. “At the conference, several miners described complex and sometimes tense working relationships with government over the last year, particularly since Zimbabwe’s March export suspension and subsequent May resumption,” Braun said.

Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, specialising in EV and battery supply chain research and insights, reports that 2.0 million electric vehicles were sold globally in June 2026, bringing YTD 2026 EV sales to 9.6 million. In June 2026, EV sales increased by 7% year-on-year (y-o-y) and by 11% month-on-month (m-o-m).

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the world’s leading supplier of mined cobalt, supplying three quarters of 2025 cobalt, and is the second largest supplier of mined copper, supplying 15% in 2025. Its transformation into a major supplier of both minerals follows significant investment from China over the last 15 years. The DRC is also home to one of the world’s largest hard rock lithium deposits, the Manono site in the country’s Tanganyika Province. It recently started operating. Manono North, owned by Zijin, is currently operating and has an eventual planned capacity of 120ktpa. A separate, AVZ-owned and CATL-backed Manono project is due to come online in 2032, with a planned capacity of 90ktpa.

CATL's Jianxiawo restart will lift Jiangxi's near-term lithium output, but offsetting suspensions and deferrals elsewhere in the province leave Benchmark's Q2 lithium forecast supply balance and price forecast essentially unchanged. CATL secured the safety production permit for its Jianxiawo lepidolite mine in Jiangxi, China on 29 June, the last official hurdle to restarting a mine that has sat idle since August 2025, when its permit expired amid a province-wide enforcement crackdown. The restart arrives slightly ahead of the September timing Benchmark's Q2 Lithium forecast had initially assumed, with 62,500 tonnes LCE now forecast to be mined from Jianxiawo in 2026. This equates to roughly 1.5% of global mined supply, with the operation ramping towards its mine-site processing capacity of by 2029.

CATL can likely restart its Jianxiawo lepidolite lithium mine in Jiangxi, China after securing a safety production permit. Benchmark has seen a copy of the permit certificate, which was considered the last official hurdle CATL needed to overcome to resume production at the mine which has been idle since August 2025. Benchmark’s Q2 Lithium Forecast anticipates 37kt lithium carbonate equivalent to be mined from Jianxiawo in 2026 assuming a September restart, accounting for ~1.5% of global mined lithium supply. This production figure could increase if the mine is restarted earlier than expected, something that is increasingly likely given the rapid pace of approvals in the past week. The mine is anticipated to operate at its planned capacity of 150ktpa by 2029.

Electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer Polestar is to exit the US market after the US Department of Commerce said it would not grant the majority-Chinese-owned, Sweden-based company authorisation to sell its vehicles in the country. Only 6% of its retail sales came from the US in Q1 2026, the company has said. The company is majority-owned by Geely, and had previously indicated that the Connected Vehicle Rule, proposed under the Biden administration to restrict import of vehicles using Chinese software and hardware, would largely prevent it from selling in the US. Since being passed, the rule has been upheld by the Trump administration, and the fresh decision to withhold authorisation reflects sustained US efforts across party lines to limit sales of Chinese EVs in the market.

China’s government has released its latest Five-Year Plan for New Energy System Development, setting out a range of new 2030 targets for its energy markets, including storage, generation and consumption. “The plan sets conservative and in-line new energy targets, serving more as a policy floor rather than a strict ceiling,” said Calvin Xu, a BESS analyst at Benchmark. “Supported by strong industry momentum, actual installations and deployments have consistently outperformed official goals during the previous five-year plan.” The plan is largely focused on “reinforcing market certainty” by providing “clear long-term development direction across renewables, energy storage, grid integration and power market reform,” Xu explained. Upcoming provincial targets and implementation rules are expected to provide more granular detail.

The copper market is often feared to be at risk of a structural shortage leading to near term market tightness. However, these concerns have often proved to be overblown as historically the supply gaps have been filled. The slow speed at which new mine supply can come online and the expectation for rapidly growing demand from global electrification and accelerating AI adoption reinforces the narrative, and perhaps the price signal, that copper supply is scarce. However, this view may be too focused on how Western mines and Western companies invest in the copper space. Indeed, over the last 15 years, Chinese companies have demonstrated their ability to deploy capital and ramp up mines around the world faster than the conventional 10–20 years considered standard by countries in the West.